Sweden’s Election and the Limits of Domestic Discretion

For context, Swedish politics is broadly divided between a centre-left opposition bloc and the governing right-wing bloc. At the time of writing, the centre-left opposition is ahead in the polls, with around 54% support compared to 45% for the right-wing bloc. However, recent data suggests that the race has been tightening over the summer. Moreover, even if one bloc wins a narrow advantage, forming a government may prove difficult. This is because the opposition parties have drawn conflicting red lines over whom they are willing to collaborate with. The Left Party demands a place in government, which the Center party – and likely also the Social Democrats, Sweden’s largest party – refuses to accept. Thus, there is no straightforward route to a viable governing majority, and the process of forming a government after 13 September is likely to be complicated.

EU policy has so far only played a minor role in the campaign. Yet the election could have important consequences for Sweden’s approach to European integration and, more concretely, for the country’s willingness and capacity to implement commitments already made at EU level. This is particularly visible in the politically salient fields of monetary integration, Schengen border controls, and climate policy. The most integrationist party in the parliament is the Liberals, which supports Swedish membership of the euro, deeper European integration, and an end to national vetoes in EU foreign and security policy. However, it is currently polling at around two percent, far below the four-percent threshold required to stay in the Riksdag. Hence, Sweden’s most explicitly pro-European party risks disappearing from parliament. At the same time, no parliamentary party is actively campaigning for Sweden to leave the EU. The nationalist Sweden Democrats have shifted strategy from calls for a Swedish withdrawal to an attempt to influence the EU from within. The Left Party has undergone a similar shift away from exit politics, while remaining opposed to measures such as Swedish euro membership. The conservative Moderate Party has said that if it remains in government, it will appoint a commission to reassess the advantages and disadvantages of joining the single currency. Sweden rejected euro membership in a referendum in 2003, when 56% voted against adoption, and the issue has struggled to return to the political debate ever since.

Even if EU membership itself is not a major conflict area in the campaign, European rules still shape some of Sweden’s most politically sensitive issues. Following the migration crisis of 2015, the country has experimented with temporary controls at its Schengen borders. Most recently, Sweden has maintained internal border controls since November 2024, primarily at the land border with Denmark, while retaining the possibility of checks at other internal borders. In a 2026 opinion, the European Commission questioned whether Sweden had provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the controls remained necessary and proportionate. It also pointed to alternative police measures and argued that Sweden should work towards phasing the controls out. Schengen allows member states to reintroduce internal border controls under exceptional circumstances, but such measures are intended to remain temporary. Phasing them out could be difficult to defend domestically when crime, migration, and security are among the election campaign’s most prominent issues.

In contrast to EU membership, fuel prices are at the centre of the political debate in Sweden right now. The Sweden Democrats, in particular, have been successful in delivering on their promise to lower fuel prices, captured in the political slogan “lower prices at the pump”. This has been achieved through lower fuel taxation and a reduced blending obligation. However, according to the Swedish Climate Policy Council, under current policies, Sweden is not on track to meet its binding 2030 EU commitment under the Effort Sharing Regulation. The Council estimates that the financial consequences of exceeding Sweden’s EU allocation could range from SEK 8 billion to SEK 40 billion, that is up to roughly €4 billion. Low fuel prices may therefore leave the next government with the politically difficult task of finding emissions reductions elsewhere. For a rules-based Europe, credibility ultimately depends on respecting common rules, even if Sweden’s per-capita emissions are below the EU average.