European Arctic Summit in Rovaniemi: Strategic Sovereignty Begins With Small Chokepoints

From 13 to 14 September, Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo will host numerous European heads of state and government in Rovaniemi, northern Finland, for the European Arctic Summit. Among those expected to attend are German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas. On Sunday 13 September, the participants will also join Finland’s President Alexander Stubb for a working lunch. The aim of the summit is to establish a stronger common strategic direction for the EU in the Arctic, whose geopolitical significance is growing rapidly. This is already the second meeting of its kind following the North-South Summit in Saariselkä in December 2024.

In a new analysis, Anselm Küsters, Research Director at cep Nordic Countries in Helsinki, sets out what Europe can learn from Finland’s icebreakers.

No longer a “region of low tension”

The summit is taking place against an extremely dynamic backdrop. In the face of accelerating climate change and geopolitical tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, the economic importance of the Northeast Passage is growing. For 2026, more than 40 million tonnes of freight are expected to pass through the Northern Sea Route for the first time, primarily due to expanded trade between Russia and China. Furthermore, in August, China launched its first regular container service through the Arctic. Finally, the EU’s Arctic policy itself is set for a reorientation: the Commission intends to present an updated Arctic strategy this autumn, in which security is to play a central role for the first time. Kaja Kallas had already advocated for this at the Arctic Frontiers conference in Tromsø earlier this year, stating that the Arctic needed more attention, more resources, and more ‘hard power’. The summit in Rovaniemi can therefore also be seen as a dress rehearsal for the new strategy.

What Finland’s icebreakers can teach Europe

Finland brings a unique perspective to this debate: over 95 per cent of Finland’s foreign trade in goods is conducted by sea, and its ports freeze over almost every winter. This structural peculiarity has given rise to a strong export sector in the field of icebreakers: Finnish companies have designed around 80 per cent of all icebreakers worldwide and built around 60 per cent; even the US Coast Guard is having the first vessels of its new Arctic Security Cutter class built in Finland because the domestic alternative could not meet the schedule. The fact that this leverage can also be utilised geopolitically has already been successfully demonstrated. At the end of September 2022, the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to grant an export licence for an LNG icebreaker ordered by the Russian mining group Norilsk Nickel, thereby bringing to an end a project that would have created around 2,100 person-years of employment.

The Finnish state does not own the shipyard – it is privately owned and is now under Canadian control – but it shapes demand and regulations. Procurement is handled by the Transport Infrastructure Agency, and funding comes primarily from fairway dues. The EU’s instruments for economic security, ranging from investment screening to dependency mapping, focus in particular on trade shares. However, as the Finnish icebreakers demonstrate, modern chokepoints can also exist in more subtle forms.

Anselm Küsters comments: “When the EU heads of state and government discuss the Arctic in Rovaniemi, they should shift their focus from the agenda to the shipyards in Helsinki. Europe’s sovereignty is not necessarily determined by expensive chip factories and AI gigafactories – which also exist elsewhere – but precisely by unassuming capabilities that would take years to replace.”

The full analysis has been published on Common Ground of Europe.